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Abstract
In this paper, we develop a model that captures the potential conflict
between two individuals who follow different fairness principles in bargain-
ing. This model is used to analyse the influence of fairness motivation
on the possibility of reaching an agreement in bargaining, and to examine
the properties of the agreement. We show that bargaining between two
individuals who are strongly fairness motivated, but who disagree about
what represents a fair division, ends in disagreement. This result contrasts
the standard bargaining model with individuals who are only motivated by
material self-interest, which always leads to agreement. Furthermore, by
applying the Nash bargaining solution, we study the influence of fairness
motivation on the bargaining outcome. A fairness motivated individual
reaches an outcome that is closer to his fairness principle in bargaining
against an individual who is only motivated by material self-interest.
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1 Introduction
An equal division of monetary rewards is a frequent outcome in many labora-
tory experiments in bargaining, and it is a common principle in many real life
situations, for example, bequests to children (Camerer, 2003; Wilhelm, 1996).
In other situations, for example, in bargaining over the output from production,
experiments in economics and psychology have shown that many people follow
a principle of proportionality, although a minority still prefer the equal division
principle (Konow, 1996; Ga¨chter and Riedl, 2005; Cappelen, Sørensen, and Tun-
godden, 2010). Fairness principles such as equality and proportionality may arise
from moral or political philosophy or simply be accepted over time as a way of
dealing with distributive issues.
Hirschman (1977) and Elster (1989) have pointed to the fact that bargaining
between individuals who strongly believe in different fairness principles can easily
lead to conflict. They both argue that material self-interest can moderate conflicts
of fairness principles, in the words of Elster (1989):
The last case, norm conflict, is less likely to yield negotiated solu-
tions. In norm-free bargaining, the only thing at stake is self-interest,
a mild if mean-spirited passion. In norm conflict, the parties argue in
terms of their honour, a notoriously strong passion capable of inspir-
ing self-destructive and self-sacrificial behaviour. . . . Compromises are
possible between opposing norms, if one or both parties pour some
water in their wine and let self-interest override honour. (Elster, 1989,
p. 244).
In this paper, we develop a model that captures the potential conflict between
two individuals who follow different fairness principles in bargaining. An indi-
vidual’s preferences are represented by a utility function where he or she trades
off material self-interest and deviations from a fairness principle. Bargaining ex-
periments such as the ultimatum game show that people are willing to trade
off monetary rewards to achieve a more fair outcome from bargaining (Camerer,
2003).
The model developed in this paper is a variation of the frequently used in-
equity aversion model, which assumes that bargainers agree on a principle of
equal division (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Bruyn and
Bolton, 2008). The model in this paper builds on Cappelen, Hole, Sørensen, and
Tungodden (2007), which allows individuals to follow different fairness principles.
This introduces a dimension of conflict between two bargainers who follow differ-
ent fairness principles, in addition to the trade-off between material self-interest
and fairness motivation.1
1It is acknowledged in many models that different fairness principles should be considered,
but are left out for reasons of intractability. See, for example, Andreoni and Bernheim (2009)
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Fairness motivation can influence both the possibility of reaching an agree-
ment in bargaining and it can influence the properties of the agreement that is
reached. The first part of the paper studies how fairness motivation influences
the possibility of reaching an agreement. Proposition 2 formalizes the intuition
of Elster (1989), that bargaining between two individuals who strongly believe
in different fairness principles ends in conflict. This result shows the importance
of considering a plurality of fairness principles to understand many bargaining
problems. In contrast, Proposition 3 formalizes that if two bargainers follow the
same fairness principle, it is always possible to reach an agreement.
The second part of the paper analyses the properties of the agreements that
can be reached. We apply the Nash bargaining solution to bargaining situations
between different types of individuals. We find that bargaining between an in-
dividual with strong fairness motivation and an individual motivated only by
material self-interest, reaches an agreement that is closer to the fairness moti-
vated individual’s principle. If two bargainers who are motivated by fairness, but
who disagree about what represents a fair division, reach an agreement, it will
be a compromise between the two fair shares. We also show that in a bargain-
ing situation where both individuals follow a fairness principle of strict equality,
the Nash bargaining solution gives an equal division, and the trade-off between
material self-interest and fairness motivation does not influence the solution.
Empirical studies have found that people follow a plurality of fairness princi-
ples in negotiations, and that this can explain bargaining impasses and how these
are solved (Bazerman, 1985; Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, and Camerer,
1995; Babcock, Wang, and Loewenstein, 1996). Section 2 discusses data from a
bargaining experiment that shows that it is also important to include a plural-
ity of fairness principles to understand the properties of the agreements that are
reached in bargaining. The agreements are from a bargaining experiment where
participants have individually produced the endowment before they bargain over
a division of the endowment. The two most common models for bargaining
problems, material self-interest and preferences for equality, do not explain the
experimental data in Section 2.
The model is presented in Section 3. Bargaining is then analysed in two steps
in Section 4. First, the influence of fairness on the bargaining set is discussed
without relying on a specific solution concept, and second, the Nash bargaining
solution is applied to the problem. Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
who discuss fairness norms other than the 50–50 norm: ‘If the players are asymmetric with
respect to publicly observed inertia of merit, the fairness of an outcome might depend on the
extent to which it departs from some other benchmark, such as xF = 0.4. Provided the players
agree on xF , similar results would follow, except that the behavioural norm would correspond
to the alternate benchmark. However, if players have different views of xF , matters are more
complex’ (footnote 12).
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2 Experiment
The laboratory experiment reported in Birkeland (2011) illustrates the impor-
tance of including fairness principles other than equality in bargaining. This
experiment consists of a production phase and a bargaining phase. First, par-
ticipants produce individually an output by typing a text from a transcript on
the computer, and they receive a monetary reward equal to each correct word
typed, rounded off to the nearest 50 words, multiplied by a randomly assigned
high or low price. Second, participants were randomly matched into pairs and
instructed to bargain over the endowment, which in this experiment is the sum
of the individual production values. The experiment used an alternating offer
bargaining protocol with infinite horizon.2
The 112 bargaining outcomes are shown in Figure 1, where the share of the
total production value to person one and to person two are on the axes. The
left panel shows the outcomes from 15 situations where both bargainers have
produced the same amount and have the same price, and the right panel shows
the outcomes from 97 situations where there is a difference in either the amount
produced or the price. All the points that are along the diagonal from the lower
left corner to the upper right corner are equal splits of the production value.
The results show that in all of the situations where bargainers have produced
the same amount (left panel), the bargaining outcome is an equal division (the
circle indicates the 10 observations that are equal divisions of the initial pro-
duction value).3 This result is consistent with the standard solution for players
motivated by material self-interest. Alternating offer bargaining between players
who are motivated by material self-interest, and have equal discount factors, gives
an almost equal split (Rubinstein, 1982).
In the right panel, 49% of the outcomes are equal divisions that give the
same amount of money to both participants. The number of equal divisions is
significantly reduced when there are differences between the players from the
production phase of the experiment. These observations are inconsistent with
the prediction of the standard model where bargainers are only motivated by
material self-interest. We show later in the paper that a model where bargainers
are motivated by strict equality cannot explain these observations either. A likely
2The alternating offer protocol starts with one of the players being randomly assigned as the
first mover who suggests an opening offer in the first round (t = 1). Individual i proposes an
amount of pay-off xi for himself and Y −xi for the other player in each round of bargaining. The
second mover responds to the opening offer by either accepting it and the bargaining is closed
without cost, or by giving a counter offer in a second round (t = 2). The endowment shrinks
in each round t by a discount factor δti . An agreement is reached when one player accepts
the offer from the other player. In the experiment discussed in this paper, both players were
induced with an equal discount factor, δ = 0.96, which is so high that there is an insignificant
first-mover advantage.
3To accommodate rounding to the nearest NOK 5, all agreements within the 47.5–52.5 split
range are characterized as equal splits.
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Figure 1: Experimental bargaining results
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Note: The left panel shows outcomes from 15 situations where bargainers have the same pro-
duction value, and the right panel shows bargaining outcomes from 97 situations where there
are differences between bargainers in terms of either the amount produced or the price. The cir-
cle indicates the number of observations that are exactly a 50–50 split of the initial production
value.
explanation for this shift to a more unequal division of the production value is that
bargainers are motivated by fairness principles that do not imply equal division
in these situations. A post-experimental questionnaire confirmed this hypothesis:
96% of the participants supported principles that justify unequal division in these
situations, whereas only 4% of the participants supported equal division. Thus,
this experiment emphasizes the importance of allowing for fairness principles
other than equal division in economic models of bargaining to understand better
many bargaining problems.
3 Model
In this section, we describe the theoretical framework for the analysis, including
the bargaining environment and a utility function that can accommodate bargain-
ers who are motivated by different fairness principles. We consider a bargaining
environment in which two players bargain over how to divide an endowment, Y .
Players can agree on any pair x = (x1, x2) of shares of the endowment, xi ∈ [0, 1],
such that the pair of shares is in the set X = {x | x1 + x2 ≤ 1}, which is called
the set of feasible agreements. In the following, we assume complete information,
that is, the rules of the game and the utility functions of both players are common
knowledge.
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3.1 Fairness principle
An individual is assumed to have preferences that can be represented by a utility
function where deviation from a fair share of the endowment reduces utility. The
fair share of the endowment to individual i, according to his fairness principle
k, is denoted as sk(i) ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that the fairness principle gives a
unique division of the endowment, which is the case for all the fairness principles
discussed in this paper.4
Assumption 1. For any endowment, Y , and fairness principle, k, there exists
a unique fair division (sk(1), sk(2)), such that sk(1) + sk(2) = 1.
The following example illustrates how principles of fairness could be applied
in a production context. Consider a case where the endowment, Y , is the sum
of individual production values, yi, which can be decomposed into the individual
production of units, ei, and price, pi, such that yi = eipi. In a two-person case,
let e1 = 3, e2 = 1, p1 =
1
3
, and p2 = 3, then the production values are y1 = 1
and y2 = 3, and the endowment Y = 4. This could, for example, be bargaining
between two executives about their share of a bonus in a corporation where one
business area is exposed to the oil price and another business area is exposed to the
aluminium price. In this context, there are three different distributive principles
that are salient, k = E,L, P . The first fairness principle is an equal sharing
of the monetary rewards, strict equality, which implies a fair share sE(i) = 1
2
.
The second fairness principle is a laissez-faire principle, where the individual
production values determine the fair share to individual i, sL(i) = eipi
Y
. The third
principle is proportionality, where the fair share to individual i is proportional
to the level of the production of units, sP (i) = ei
e1+e2
, but where prices have no
influence on the division.
In our example, implementation of these three fairness principles for two in-
dividuals gives the nine combinations of fair shares in Table 1. Each entry in
the table shows the fair share that person one and person two claim according to
their fairness principle, if that is only what they care about. The combinations
of fairness principles can be divided into three categories: (i) both players follow
the same fairness principle (diagonal elements), where by Assumption 1 the fair
shares are always compatible; (ii) players one and two follow different fairness
principles such that fair shares are incompatible, sk(1) +sk(2) > 1; (iii) players one
and two follow different fairness principles such that fair shares sum to less than
one, sk(1) + sk(2) < 1. Category (ii) is a natural bargaining situation where there
4The relevant set of fairness principles must be specified for the context in the model is ap-
plied. Which fairness principle an individual follows in a particular context, may depend on his
identity; for example, an individual may follow a different fairness principle if he is an employer
or if he is an employee (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010). The formulation of a fairness principle as
a fair share of the endowment excludes some possible fairness principles, for example, principles
that are related to the size of the endowment.
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Table 1: Combinations of fairness principles
sE(2) sL(2) sP (2)
sE(1) (1
2
, 1
2
) (1
2
, 3
4
) (1
2
, 1
4
)
sL(1) (1
4
, 1
2
) (1
4
, 3
4
) (1
4
, 1
4
)
sP (1) (3
4
, 1
2
) (3
4
, 3
4
) (3
4
, 1
4
)
Note: The table shows combinations of the fairness principles E,L, P for person one and person
two for parameters e1 = 3, e2 = 1, p1 = 13 , p2 = 3. Each entry shows the fair shares that person
one and person two claim according to their principles if they only care about fairness.
is conflict of interest. Category (iii) is less important in bargaining and will not
be discussed in the following analysis.
In this numerical example, different fairness principles give different fair shares,
but this is not necessarily the case in all situations. Different principles can also
give the same fair shares in some situations; for example, an equal division fol-
lows both from the fairness principle of strict equality, and from the principle of
proportionality if both individuals have produced the same number of units.
3.2 Utility function
We assume that the utility function is additively separable for individual i in his
own share of the endowment, xi, and the cost of deviating from the fair share,
xi − sk(i). The endowment is assumed to be non-negative, Y ≥ 0.
Assumption 2. Individual i’s preferences can be represented by the utility func-
tion:
ui(xiY, s
k(i)Y ) = (xi − βi(xi − sk(i))2)Y.
The utility loss from deviating from the fair share is squared, which implies
that the utility loss from deviation to the better or the worse is symmetric,
and that the utility loss increases exponentially with the distance. The weight
individual i has on not deviating from his fair share is given by the parameter
βi, which is assumed to be non-negative, βi ≥ 0. If βi = 0, the model is reduced
to material self-interest, a utility function that is linear in xi. The parameter βi
captures tension between an individual’s motivation to follow a fairness principle
and that of material self-interest.5 This utility function is continuous, twice
5The functional form of the utility function follows the two-person case of Bolton and Ock-
enfels (2000), Lopomo and Ok (2001), Cappelen et al. (2007), and Bruyn and Bolton (2008).
The parameter βi captures the trade-off that is represented by the fraction bi2ai in Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000). The utility function in this paper differs from Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)
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differentiable and concave in xi. The utility function attains its inner maximum
when:
x∗i =
1
2βi
+ sk(i).
The interior solution to an individual, x∗i , is not defined for βi = 0, and it is
independent of the endowment Y . The utility function is strictly increasing in
the interval 0 ≤ xi ≤ sk(i). Only for small values of βi, that is, βi < 12(1−sk(i)) ,
is the utility function strictly increasing in the entire interval 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1. For
high values of βi, the importance of obtaining the fair share outweighs the utility
of obtaining a larger share of the endowment, see also Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000). In the case that βi →∞, the interior solution approaches the fair share,
x∗i → sk(i).
This model allows for different types of players: a material self-interested
player, a strongly fairness motivated player, as well as an intermediate type that
trades off material self-interest and fairness motivation. It also introduces differ-
ences regarding which fairness principle players follow.
The effects of changing the parameters of the weights assigned to fairness, βi,
and the fair share, sk(i), are illustrated in Figure 2. We observe that all three
utility functions illustrated in the figure attain negative values for a small x, but
only the utility function with a high βi attains negative values for a large x.
Shifting the fair share, sk(i), to a higher value raises the point where the utility
function is zero. We also observe that the utility function with a high βi envelops
the utility function with the same fair share, sk(i), but a lower βi, because an
increase in fairness motivation reduces the utility from deviating from the fair
share.
In bargaining, people evaluate their utility from possible agreements against
the utility from the situation where no agreement is reached. We assume that
the disagreement utility is zero.
Assumption 3. Individual i’s utility from disagreement is zero, udi = 0.
Assumption 3 follows directly from the specification of the utility function in
an economic environment where the endowment is zero in disagreement, Y = 0,
which is the case in many bargaining experiments. This assumption implies,
in that it allows for fair shares other than sk(i) = 12 . In the model of Lopomo and Ok (2001), a
bargainer’s utility depends on both his absolute gain and the relative share he gets compared
with the average share. The model of Lopomo and Ok (2001) allows for uncertainty about
the weight that the other players have on the deviation from the average share. The utility
function in Cappelen et al. (2007) allows for different fairness principles, but the principles are
not defined in shares of the endowment. The utility function used in Bruyn and Bolton (2008)
is linear above an equal division. If you introduce players with different fairness principles in
a model with asymmetries in valuing deviations from a fair share, e.g., the Bruyn and Bolton
(2008) model, this could easily result in a non-convex Pareto frontier of the bargaining set,
which could give multiple Nash bargaining solutions.
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Figure 2: The utility function
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Note: The utility function given in Assumption 2 for different parameter values, Y = 1.
however, that an individual’s fairness consideration does not apply to the dis-
agreement outcome.
3.3 Reservation points
An individual’s reservation point is defined as the share that makes an individual
indifferent between accepting an offer or choosing disagreement, which gives zero
utility. As illustrated in Figure 2, the present model allows for more than one
reservation point. The lower reservation point, xLi in the interval 0 ≤ xLi ≤ sk(i),
where ui(xiY, s
k(i)Y ) = 0 is given by:
xLi =
1 + 2βis
k(i) −
√
1 + 4βisk(i)
2βi
.
The reservation point is influenced both by the fairness principle and the weight
that an individual attaches to following the fairness principle. For a fairness mo-
tivated individual, βi > 0, an offer below the lower reservation point would be
considered too unfair, and it is therefore rejected, although the offer represents
a positive share of the endowment. In contrast, the utility function for an in-
dividual who is only motivated by material self-interest, βi = 0, always has a
lower reservation point at zero, and he would not reject a positive share of the
endowment.
An important property of the lower reservation point is that when βi increases
the reservation point, xLi , approaches the fair share:
lim
βi→∞
xLi = s
k(i).
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We focus on the lower reservation because it is used later in the paper to analyse
the bargaining set. For large values of βi, there is also an upper reservation point,
xHi , in the interval s
k(i) ≤ xHi ≤ 1. The upper reservation point will correspond
to situations where a player, for example, is offered the whole gain, and he rejects
this as unfair even though it benefits him.
Proposition 1. Reservation points. For any fair share sk(i), there is a value βˆi
such that for any 0 < βi < βˆi there exists a unique reservation point, x
L
i , and for
any βi ≥ βˆi there exist two reservation points, xLi , and xHi .
Proof. See Appendix A.
4 Bargaining solutions
In this section, we use cooperative bargaining theory to analyse the outcome
from bilateral bargaining with fairness motivated individuals. A cooperative bar-
gaining solution is not based on a specific bargaining process. It is assumed
that an agreement from bargaining is binding and enforceable through a legal
system outside of the model. Cooperative bargaining theory builds on a utility
representation of the feasible agreements, which is the convex utility set:6
U = {(u1(x1Y, sk(1)Y ), u2(x2Y, sk(2)Y )) : x ∈ X} .
First, following standard analysis we require that the agreement is at the fron-
tier of the utility set, which implies that the agreement is in the set Z =
{x | x1 + x2 = 1}.7 Second, we require that the agreement gives both players
at least as much utility as they can get without an agreement, which from As-
sumption 3 implies that the agreement must give both players at least zero utility.
These two requirements ensure that the agreement is in the bargaining set, B.8
Assumption 4. An agreement is in the bargaining set:
B(U) = {(u1(x1Y, sk(1)Y ), u2(x2Y, sk(2)Y )) ≥ (0, 0) : x ∈ Z} .
Bargaining sets for two individuals are illustrated in Figure 3, where the left
panel shows individuals who disagree on what is a fair division, and the right
panel shows individuals who agree on what is a fair division. Each line represents
a bargaining set for different parameter values for person one and person two. The
two end-points of a bargaining set are defined where person one gets maximum
utility given that person two gets enough utility to accept the agreement, which
must be at his lower reservation point, (umax1 , u2(x
L
2 ) = 0), and similarly where
person two gets maximum utility given that person one gets enough utility to
accept the agreement (u1(x
L
1 ) = 0, u
max
2 ).
6Two strictly increasing concave functions give a convex combination (Binmore, 2007).
7Roth (1979) discusses the standard assumptions of cooperative bargaining theory.
8Here, ≥ is defined coordinatewise, that is, (x1, x2) ≥ (y1, y2) iff xi ≥ yi for each i = 1, 2.
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Figure 3: Bargaining sets
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Note: The left panel shows bargaining sets where players have incompatible fair shares, and the
right panel shows bargaining sets where they agree on fair shares. The lines represent different
levels of (β1, β2). The endowment Y = 1. Points marked x and y are the end-points of the
Pareto frontier for the dotted line.
We observe that the bargaining set for fairness motivated individuals is typ-
ically smaller than the bargaining set for players who are more motivated by
material self-interest. The bargaining set shrinks when βi increases because an
individual gets disutility from deviating from the fair share, and he consequently
increases his reservation point. A smaller bargaining set means that there are
fewer possible agreements that can be realized. It is often argued that the fre-
quency of disagreements in bargaining is higher when there are fewer possible
agreements that can be realized. The relationship between the size of the bar-
gaining set and the efficiency of bargaining is, however, unclear. Crawford (1982),
for example, develops a bargaining model where disagreements are reduced when
the size of the bargaining set shrinks.
The left panel in Figure 3 represents bargaining sets where players have in-
compatible fair shares. In this case, the bargaining set moves towards the origin
for bargainers who are more fairness motivated, and at some point, the bargain-
ing set is empty, which occurs when reservation points are incompatible, i.e., the
reservation points combined constitute more than the endowment. Consequently,
11
players prefer to disagree. This shows that strong preferences for conflicting fair-
ness principles make it impossible to reach an agreement.
Proposition 2. Principled disagreement. If the fair shares are incompatible,
sk(1) + sk(2) > 1, then there exists a (βˆ1, βˆ2) such that for any (β1 ≥ βˆ1, β2 ≥ βˆ2),
the only feasible solution is the disagreement outcome.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The right panel in Figure 3 represents bargaining sets where both players
follow the same fairness principle. We observe from Figure 3 that for players who
are more fairness motivated, the bargaining set shrinks and envelopes the point
that both players consider a fair division. The bargaining set shrinks further for
players who are strongly motivated by the fairness principle, and in the limit, the
bargaining set only contains the fair solution. Proposition 3 formalizes the point
that, for bargainers who follow the same fairness principle, it is always possible
to reach an agreement.
Proposition 3. Principled agreement. If two individuals follow the same fairness
principle, k, then there always exists a non-empty bargaining set, B. Increases in
β1 and β2 give a shrinking bargaining set, and in the limit, it collapses to a single
point, which represents the fair division (sk(1), sk(2)).
Proof. See Appendix A.
The reservation point of a player can drop below the other player’s utility
maximizing offer, and still give the first player more utility than in disagreement.
This occurs when the two bargainers agree on the fairness principle, and at least
one of them is strongly fairness motivated. The bargaining set marked with a
dotted line in the right panel in Figure 3 has two points marked x and y. The
line connecting these two points is the Pareto frontier.9 A high βi changes the
curvature of the frontier of the bargaining set such that the line segment up to
the point marked x represents a Pareto improvement for player one, and the line
segment up to the point marked y represents a Pareto improvement for player two.
Pareto optimality is a requirement for the Nash bargaining solution discussed in
the next section.
9The point marked x in Figure 3 is defined as the maximum utility that player two can
achieve, given that no further Pareto improvement for player one is possible, (u˜1, umax2 ) where
u˜1 > u1(xL) = 0, and the point marked y is the maximum utility that player one can achieve,
given that no further Pareto improvement for player two is possible, (umax1 , u˜2), where u˜2 >
u2(xL) = 0.
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4.1 Nash bargaining solution
A commonly used concept for finding a unique outcome in the bargaining set is
the Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950).10 The Nash bargaining solution is
the maximum of the product of the utility minus the utility of disagreement, udi :
max(u1 − ud1)(u2 − ud2).
The analytical solution to the Nash bargaining solution for the model developed
in this paper is derived in Appendix B. The non-linearity of the utility function
makes the analytical solution difficult to interpret, but the effect of changing the
parameters can easily be interpreted by studying numerical computations.
Figure 4 shows the Nash bargaining solution for different combinations of
players. Each point on the four panels shows the share that player one receives,
x1, at different levels of the fairness weight, β1.
11 The four panels show matching
of player one against different types of player two. The standard solution for
two players only motivated by material self-interest is an equal division of the
monetary gain, which is the starting point in the upper left panel. This panel
shows that if player one has a higher weight on following his fairness principle,
the bargaining solution gives a share that is closer to his fair share, which in this
example is sk(1) = 3
4
. A fairness motivated player who takes a principled stand
in bargaining will achieve a solution that is closer to his fairness principle if he
bargains against a player who is only motivated by material self-interest.
In the upper right panel both players are fairness motivated, and they agree
on the fair division (sk(1) = 3
4
, sk(2) = 1
4
). We observe that all the bargaining
solutions are close to the fair division. An increase in the trade-off between self-
interest and fairness motivation, β1, has an insignificant effect on the bargaining
solution. In line with Proposition 2, sufficiently high weights on following the
same fairness principle give the fair division.
In the lower left panel, player two is also a fairness motivated player, but in this
example player two disagrees with player one about the fairness principle. Both
players believe that it would be fair if they get three-quarters of the endowment;
thus, they both have the same fair share (sk(1) = 3
4
, sk(2) = 3
4
). From the lower left
panel, we see that at low levels of β1, the bargaining solution is a division that is
close to player two’s fair share. At high levels of β1, the bargaining solution is a
compromise solution between the fair shares, which in this example is an equal
10Nash (1950) proves that this is the only solution that fulfils four reasonable axioms: (i)
the solution should be independent of affine transformations of the utility function; (ii) the
solution should be independent of irrelevant alternatives; (iii) the solution should treat players
symmetrically; and (iv) the solution should be Pareto optimal. An introduction to bargaining
theory and the Nash axioms is found in Roth (1979) and Binmore (2007).
11Bruyn and Bolton (2008) and Cappelen et al. (2007) estimate the average weight that an
individual has on following his fairness principle. The average weight, converted to a value
comparable to βi, is 6.0 for a three-round bargaining game in Bruyn and Bolton (2008), and
7.7 for a dictator game in Cappelen et al. (2007).
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Figure 4: Nash bargaining solution
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Note: The graph shows the Nash bargaining solution for the share that player one receives,
x1, for different levels of the fairness weight, β1. Player one has a fairness principle sk(1) = 34
in the first three panels, and sk(1) = 12 in the lower right panel. The parameters for player
two are: ‘Fairness vs. self-interest’: β2 = 0; ‘Fairness agreement’: β2 = 7, sk(2) = 14 ; ‘Fairness
disagreement’: β2 = 7, sk(2) = 34 ; ‘Equality’: β2 = 7, s
k(2) = 12 . The endowment Y = 1.
division. Importantly, in line with Proposition 3, two players who disagree about
what is a fair share cannot reach an agreement if their fairness motivation is too
strong. At the level of β1 = 10 in the lower left panel, the bargain solution is the
disagreement outcome of zero.
The lower right panel shows the case where both players are fairness motivated
and both players agree on a principle of strict equality. We can see that, in this
case, the trade-off between self-interest and fairness motivation, β1, does not
influence the solution. This last result follows from the property of symmetric
treatment of players in the Nash bargaining solution.
Proposition 4. Fairness weight impotency. If bargainers follow the fairness
principle of strict equality, sk(1) = sk(2) = 1
2
, then the Nash bargaining solution is
(xN1 =
1
2
, xN2 =
1
2
) for any β1, β2.
Proof. See Appendix A.
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4.2 The generalized Nash bargaining solution
There is a version of the Nash bargaining solution that allows for bargaining
power, αi, to influence the solution:
max(u1 − ud1)α1(u2 − ud2)α2 .
In the standard case where individuals are only motivated by material self-
interest, the individual with more bargaining power gets a larger share of the
endowment than a player with less bargaining power. Similarly, in bargaining be-
tween two equally fairness motivated individuals who disagree about fair shares,
the individual with more bargaining power gets closer to his fair share. This ar-
gument also works the other way, a more fairness motivated individual gets closer
to his fair share for a given distribution of bargaining power. Fairness motivation
can therefore counterbalance the influence of unfavourable bargaining power.
Moreover, the same outcome that follows from bargaining between two equally
strong fairness motivated individuals who agree on the fairness principle, may also
be the result of bargaining between self-interested individuals who have bargain-
ing power distributed in the same proportion as the fair shares. An interpretation
of this result is that there are two ways to achieve a fair outcome in bargaining,
through agreement about fairness principles or regulation of bargaining power.
However, in one case where the relative bargaining power is distributed in
the exact same proportion as the fair shares that follow from a fairness principle,
fairness motivation does not influence the generalized Nash bargaining solution.
This result is similar to Proposition 4 where individuals are motivated by the fair-
ness principle of strict equality and they have equal bargaining power. Numerical
computation gives support to the following conjecture (see Appendix A).
Conjecture 1. Generalized fairness weight impotency. If sk(1) + sk(2) = 1, α1 =
sk(1) and α2 = s
k(2), then the generalized Nash bargaining solution is (xN1 =
sk(1), xN2 = s
k(2)), for any β1, β2.
5 Concluding remarks
Individuals who are only motivated by material self-interest are always able to
make a compromise and find an agreement, provided that the monetary reward
from agreement is higher than from the disagreement outcome. For fairness
motivated individuals, the outcome from bargaining will depend both on the
principle they follow, and the trade-off they make between following the principle
and material self-interest. First, people who are motivated by the same fairness
principle have a non-empty bargaining set and it is always possible to reach an
agreement, and if they have a high weight on following the principle, they will
agree on the fair outcome. Second, if people disagree about what is a fair share,
it may be impossible to reach an agreement, particularly if they have a high
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weight on following their principles. Disagreement can easily be the outcome
from bargaining between players that insist on different fairness principles.
The Nash bargaining solution shows that bargaining between an individual
with strong fairness motivation and an individual only motivated by material self-
interest reaches an outcome that is closer to the fairness motivated individual’s
principle. In bargaining between two individuals motivated by fairness, and who
disagree about what represents a fair division, the Nash bargaining solution gives
an outcome that is a compromise between the fair shares. If individuals follow
the commonly assumed fairness principle of strict equality, the trade-off between
following the fairness principle and material self-interest does not influence the
outcome. The generalized Nash bargaining solution shows that a strongly fair-
ness motivated individual can balance the higher bargaining power of another
individual.
This research could be extended both theoretically and empirically. An inter-
esting theoretical extension is to incorporate characteristics of the disagreement
outcome into individuals’ fairness principles. Another important issue for further
research is how social preference models influence the efficiency of bargaining.
Finally, I would like to point to several empirical hypotheses for fairness mo-
tivation that can be derived from the analysis in this paper. First, material
self-interest may be more predominant in societies where there is a great deal of
plurality of fairness principles among people, and conversely, in a more homoge-
neous society, people may be more fairness motivated. In societies with a great
deal of heterogeneity, it is important to reach compromises in transactions. Thus,
an environment that fosters material self-interest may perform better than one
that fosters fairness motivation. Second, the analysis in this paper shows that
fairness motivation could develop among groups in societies where the bargain-
ing power is to their disadvantage. The mobilization of fairness motivation can
neutralize the imbalance of bargaining power. The development of strong fair-
ness principles among unions in wage negotiations could be an example of this.
Third, in societies with strong groups that are motivated by different fairness
principles, the analysis shows that there can be more conflicts, for example, in
societies where employers and employees strongly believe in different principles
of wage setting.
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Appendix A Proof of propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
We want to show that for any fair share, sk(i), there is a value βˆi such that for any
0 < βi < βˆi there exists a unique reservation point, x
L
i , and for any βi ≥ βˆi there
exist two reservation points, xLi , and x
H
i . The utility function in Assumption 1:
ui(xiY, s
k(i)Y ) = (xi − βi(xi − sk(i))2)Y,
is a quadratic equation:
a1x
2 + a2x+ a3 = 0,
where the coefficients are reduced to:
a1 = −βi,
a2 = (1 + 2βis
k(i)),
a3 = −βi(sk(i))2.
The discriminant, a22−4a1a3 = 1 + 4βisk(i), is positive and hence the utility func-
tion has two real, distinct roots. The quadratic formula gives the two solutions:
xLi =
1 + 2βis
k(i) −
√
1 + 4βisk(i)
2βi
, xHi =
1 + 2βis
k(i) +
√
1 + 4βisk(i)
2βi
.
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These solutions are not defined for βi = 0. By definition, a fair share, s
k(i), can
have values in the interval 0 ≤ sk(i) ≤ 1. We see that if sk(i) = 0, then xLi = 0.
Differentiate xLi with respect to βi:
dxLi
dβi
=
1 + 2βis
k(i) −
√
1 + 4βisk(i)
2β2i
√
1 + 4βisk(i)
.
For the numerator to be positive, 1 + 2βis
k(i) >
√
1 + 4βisk(i). By squaring both
sides of the inequality we see that the numerator is always positive for sk(i) > 0.
Hence,
dxLi
dβi
> 0, and xLi is strictly increasing in βi for s
k(i) > 0. We know from
Section 3.3 that limβi→∞ x
L
i = s
k(i). Thus, there always exists a lower reservation
point, xLi , which attains values in the interval 0 ≤ xLi ≤ sk(i).
We then consider the upper reservation point, xHi . We can see that if s
k(i) = 1,
then xHi > 1, which is outside of the domain of the utility function for argument
xi. Differentiate x
H
i with respect to βi:
dxHi
dβi
=
−1− 2βisk(i) −
√
1 + 4βisk(i)
2β2i
√
1 + 4βisk(i)
.
We see that xHi is strictly decreasing in βi, since
dxHi
dβi
< 0. If sk(i) < 1, then
xHi may attain values in the interval 0 < x
H
i ≤ 1, depending on the relationship
between sk(i) and βi. Define βˆi such that x
H = 1, which gives:
βˆi =
1
(1− sk(i))2 .
Any βi ≥ βˆi will give an upper reservation point in the interval 0 < xHi ≤ 1.
Hence, for βi in the interval 0 < βi < βˆi, there exists a unique reservation point,
xLi , and for βi ≥ βˆi there exist two reservation points, xLi , and xHi .
Proof of Proposition 2
We want to show that if the fair shares are incompatible, sk(1) + sk(2) > 1, then
there exists a (βˆ1, βˆ2) such that for any (β1 ≥ βˆ1, β2 ≥ βˆ2), the only feasible
solution is the disagreement outcome. Note that by assumption, if sk(1)+sk(2) > 1,
then sk(1) > 0 and sk(2) > 0.
1. From Section 4 we know that B is empty if xL1 + xL2 > 1.
2. From Proposition 1 we know that there exists a lower reservation point, xLi ,
which is strictly increasing in βi for s
k(i) > 0.
3. Define ε < |1−sk(1)−sk(2)
2
|. Find (βˆ1, βˆ2) such that xL1 = sk(1) − ε and xL2 =
sk(2) − ε.
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4. It follows from step 2 and step 3 that xL1 +x
L
2 > 1 for any (β1 ≥ βˆ1, β2 ≥ βˆ2).
Hence, from step 1 it then follows that B is empty, and the only feasible
solution is the disagreement outcome.
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider any combination of (β1, β2). We want to show that B(β1, β2) is non-
empty, i.e. xL1 +x
L
2 ≤ 1, if two individuals who follow the same fairness principle,
k.
1. From Assumption 1 we know that if two individuals follow the same fairness
principle, k, then sk(1) + sk(2) = 1.
2. From Proposition 1 we know that there exists a lower reservation point, xLi ,
which is monotonically increasing in βi in the interval 0 ≤ xLi ≤ sk(i). For
a given (β1, β2), we find (x
L
1 , x
L
2 ) by using the formula in Proposition 1.
3. By taking into account step 1, it follows from step 2 that xL1 + x
L
2 ≤ 1, and
hence B(β1, β2) is non-empty. This completes the proof of the first part of
Proposition 3.
4. We also want to show that an increase in β1 and β2 in the limit collapses to a
single point, which represents the fair division (sk(1), sk(2)). If (β1, β2)→∞,
it follows from Proposition 1 that (xL1 , x
L
2 )→ (sk(1), sk(2)). By Assumption
1, (sk(1), sk(2)) is a unique element. Hence, in the limit B only contains one
element, which is the utility representation of (sk(1), sk(2)). This completes
the proof of the second part of Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 4
Consider any combination of β1 ≥ 0 and β2 ≥ 0. We want to show that if
bargainers follow the fairness principle of strict equality, then the Nash bargaining
solution is (xN1 =
1
2
, xN2 =
1
2
).
1. Consider the case where β1 = β2 = 0. The model is then reduced to a
standard utility function, and it follows straightforwardly that the solution
is (xN1 =
1
2
, xN2 =
1
2
).
2. Consider the case where β1 > 0 and β2 > 0. By assumption, the parameter
values are sk(1) = sk(2) = 1
2
in the Nash bargaining solution.
3. Differentiate the Nash bargaining solution (as stated in Appendix B) with
respect to β1 and β2. If you evaluate these two expressions for any β1 and
β2, the outcome is zero. Hence, changes in β1 and β2 do not influence the
Nash bargaining solution.
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Examples of Conjecture 1
Table 2: Asymmetric bargaining power
β2
1 5 10
1 (0.75, 0.25) (0.75, 0.25) (0.75, 0.25)
β1 5 (0.75, 0.25) (0.75, 0.25) (0.75, 0.25)
10 (0.75, 0.25) (0.75, 0.25) (0.75, 0.25)
Note: Table 2 shows a numerical computation of the generalized Nash bargaining solution for
person one and person two for parameters α1 = sk(1) = 0.75, and α2 = sk(2) = 0.25.
Table 3: Symmetric bargaining power
β2
1 5 10
1 (0.5, 0.5) (0.5, 0.5) (0.5, 0.5)
β1 5 (0.5, 0.5) (0.5, 0.5) (0.5, 0.5)
10 (0.5, 0.5) (0.5, 0.5) (0.5, 0.5)
Note: Table 3 shows a numerical computation of the generalized Nash bargaining solution for
person one and person two for parameters α1 = sk(1) = 0.5, and α2 = sk(2) = 0.5.
Appendix B Analytical solution
The Nash bargaining solution can be found by solving the optimization problem:
max (u1 − ud1)(u2 − ud2)
s.t. x1 + x2 = 1.
From Section 3.2 we have:
ui(xiY, s
k(i)Y ) = (xi − βi(xi − sk(i))2)Y,
udi = 0.
By substituting the constraint into the objective function, the optimization prob-
lem can be written as:
max f(x1) =
(
(x1 − β1(x1 − s1)2)Y
)(
(1− x1 − β2(1− x1 − s2)2)Y
)
.
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Differentiating f with respect to x1 gives a cubic equation (the subscript on x is
suppressed):
a1x
3 + a2x
2 + a3x+ a4 = 0,
where the coefficients are:
a1 = 4β1β2Y
2,
a2 = (3β1 − 3β2 − 6β1β2 − 6s1β1β2 + 6s2β1β2)Y 2,
a3 = (−2− 2β1 − 4s1β1 + 4β2 − 4s2β2 + 2β1β2 + 8s1β1β2 + 2s21β1β2
− 4s2β1β2 − 8s1s2β1β2 + 2s22β1β2)Y 2,
a4 = (1 + 2s1β1 + s
2
1β1 − β2 + 2s2β2 − s22β2 − 2s1β1β2 − 2s21β1β2
+ 4s1s2β1β2 + 2s
2
1s2β1β2 − 2s1s22β1β2)Y 2.
Define the following relationships:
Q ≡ a3
3a1
−
(
a2
3a1
)2
,
R ≡ a3a2
6a21
− a4
2a1
−
(
a2
3a1
)3
,
D ≡ Q3 +R2,
S ≡
(
R +
√
D
) 1
3
,
T ≡
(
R−
√
D
) 1
3
.
D is the discriminant that determines the nature of the roots of the equation. If
D > 0, there is one real root and two conjugate complex roots; if D = 0, there
are real roots of which at least two are equal; if D < 0, there are three distinct
real roots. In this model, D is negative and there are three distinct real roots.
Cardano’s formulae for the roots are as follows:
root1 = − a2
3a1
+ (S + T ),
root2 = − a2
3a1
− 1
2
(S + T ) +
1
2
i
√
3(S − T ),
root3 = − a2
3a1
− 1
2
(S + T )− 1
2
i
√
3(S − T ),
where i =
√−1. It turns out for this model that root2 < root3 < root1. The
optimal solution is xN1 = root3, and the Nash bargaining solution is (x
N
1 , 1−xN1 ).
The solution is only defined for β1 > 0 and β2 > 0. To make sure the solution is
in the bargaining set B(U), check that (u1(xN1 ), u2(1− xN1 )) > (0, 0).
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